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The cross-appellant, David Moore, pursuant to Rule 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits this Appeal Brief. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to decide 
this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 (a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(i). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in finding that the Divorce 
Decree provided for a minimum subsistence level of $1,500 per 
month, which amount was to continue for a minimum of three years 
regardless of remarriage or emancipation, irrespective of the trial 
court's finding that $300 per month was designated alimony and $200 
a month per child was designated as child support? 
2. Did the trial court err in denying David Moore's Motion 
to Alter or Amend Judgment and by concluding that David Moore alone 
was to provide medical coverage for the children, including the 
payment of all premiums, deductibles, co-payments and uninsured 
medical expenses, irrespective of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45-7.1 and §78-45-7.15? 
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3. Did the trial court err in concluding that cash payments 
made directly to the children, and all other payments of gifts to 
the children from David Moore in the form of cash, clothing, cars 
or car repair, vacations, or other miscellaneous expenses, 
including health insurance premiums and medical expenses, are not 
to be considered child support? 
4. Did the trial court err in not reducing Moore's child 
support obligation based on the change in his finaincial situation 
after entry of the Decree of Divorce? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court's findings of fact may be set aside if found 
to be clearly erroneous. Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; Mauqrhan v. Mauahan. 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The trial court's legal conclusions will be given no deference and 
will be reviewed for legal correctness. General Glass Corp. v. 
Mast Construction Co. 754 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The following statutory provision are determinative of the 
issues on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(5) 
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Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.10 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.1 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a divorce proceeding, specifically dealing with 
child support issues. This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment entered after a bench trial held 
on October 27, 1993. Also appealed is the trial court's denial of 
David Moore's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. The judgment was 
entered in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, Utah, 
the Honorable Ray M. Harding presiding. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
The plaintiff filed his Complaint for Divorce in 1986. (R. 3). 
The Decree of Divorce was entered on August 25, 1987. (R. 58). On 
February 27, 1987, Sandra Moore filed a verified Petition for Order 
to Show Cause re: Contempt and Child Support Arrearage. (R. 68) . 
In response, David Moore filed a Petition to Modify Decree of 
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Divorce (R. 95) and an Amended Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce. (R. 99) . 
Trial on the Order to Show Cause and Petition to Modify was 
held before Judge Harding on October 27, 1993. (R. 387, R. 454-
680). On December 2, 1993, Judge Harding issued his Memorandum 
Decision containing his ruling on trial issues. (R. 405). Before 
the entry of any final judgment, Sandra Moore filed a Request for 
Supplemental Rulings. (R. 412). On March 7, 1994, Judge Harding 
issued a Memorandum Decision on that Request for Supplemental 
Rulings. (R. 414). Findings of Facts, Conclusion of Law and 
Judgment were finally entered on April 13, 1995 (R. 420). 
On April 24, 1995 , David Moore filed a Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment regarding his past and future obligation to provide 
medical coverage for the children. (R. 422) . In a Memorandum 
Decision of June 19, 1995, Judge Harding denied David Moore's 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. (R. 443). The Order Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment was entered on July 
6, 1995. (R. 444). David Moore filed his Notice of Appeal and Cost 
Bond on August 3, 1995 (R. 451-453). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Decree of Divorce ("Decree") in this case was 
entered on August 25, 1987. (R.58). 
2. The Decree was drafted by counsel for Sandra Moore 
Nielson ("Nielson"). (R. 462, 464). 
3. David Moore ("Moore") was not represented by counsel 
regarding the regarding the drafting of the Decree. (R. 459). 
4. Moore and Nielson have six children: Janessa, born 
August 12, 1970; Holly, born April 14, 1972; Matt, born March 9, 
1973; John, born February 12, 1976; Nathan, born July 28, 1978; and 
Jamie Lee, born March 22, 1983. (R. 47-53). 
5. The Decree provided that Moore was to pay Nielson the 
sum of "$l,500 per month, for alimony and child support." (R. 54-
58) . 
6* The Decree does not make any specific allocation of the 
$1,500 regarding how much is to be paid for alimony and how much is 
to be paid for child support per month. (R. 54-58, 462-464). 
7. Negotiations of the parties before the Decree was 
entered establish that $300 per month was to be paid for alimony 
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and $200 was to be paid for the six children of Moore and Nielson 
for a total child support payment of $1,200 per month. (R. 460). 
8. Judge Harding specifically found that under the Decree, 
alimony was $300 a month and child support was $200 per month per 
Child. (R. 403-405, 415-420). 
9. Judge Harding ordered any child support arrearage *to be 
offset by any amounts previously paid for alimony and child 
support." (R. 403-405, 415-420). 
10. At the time the Decree of Divorce was entered, David 
Moore was earning only $2,000 a month. It was anticipated that 
David Moore's income would increase in the future. (R. 471, 630, 
54-58). 
11. The Decree stated that the $1,500 per month would not be 
reduced or modified before June 1, 1988. (R. 54-58). 
12. Moore filed his initial Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce on or about August 26, 1989. (R. 95). 
13. In July of 1988, Sandra Moore remarried. (R. 636). 
14. In August of 1988, Jenessa Moore turned 18 and went to 
live in California. On April 14, 1990, Holly Moore turned 18. 
Matt Moore turned 18 on March 9, 1993. (R. 47-53). 
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15. Moore paid $1,500 alimony and child support every month 
from July of 1987 through July of 1988. (Plaintiff Exhibit 10, R. 
384, 415-420). 
16. In August, 1988, Moore began paying $1,000 alimony and 
child support, deducting $300 paid for alimony based on Nielson's 
remarriage in July of 1988 and deducting $200 per month for 
Jenessa, who reached the age of majority in August of 1988. (R. 
463, 415-420). 
17. From August 1988 to April 1990, when Holly Moore reached 
the age of majority, Moore paid a total of $16,214 in child support 
directly to Nielson. (Plaintiff Exhibit 10, Defendant Exhibit 26). 
18. From August 1988 to April 1990, Moore paid an additional 
$1,110 directly to Jenessa Moore for support. (Plaintiff Exhibit 
10, R. 384). 
19. From June 1989 through December 1989, Holly lived with 
Moore in Sandy, Utah. For that seven month period, David Moore 
reduced his child support payment to Sandra Moore by $200, 
representing support for Holly during those months. (Plaintiff 
Exhibit 10, Defendant Exhibit 26, R. 415-420). 
20. Matt Moore turned 18 on March 9, 1991. (R. 47-53). 
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21. From April 1990 through March 1991, Moore paid $9,100 in 
child support directly to Nielson. During that period of time, 
Moore paid $700 directly to Jenessa for support. (Plaintiff Exhibit 
10, Defendant Exhibit 26, R. 415-420). 
22. From April 1991 to the time of trial, Moore made cash 
payments directly to Nielson of $9,325, including one $3,000 
cashiers check in December 1992/January 1993 and a $2,900 cashiers 
check in April 1993. (Plaintiff Exhibit 10, Defendant Exhibit 26, 
R. 384, R. 415-420). 
23. In June 1993, Moore gave title to a $3,000 1983 Chevy 
automobile to Nielson. It was understood by the parties that that 
was $3,000 toward child support. Judge Harding did not allow this 
as child support. (R. 403-405). 
24; In addition to these direct child support payments, 
Moore paid over $70,000 since entry of the Decree to the time of 
trial, either directly to his children or for clothing, cars and 
car repairs, food, health insurance premiums, medical expenses, 
vacations, gifts, or other miscellaneous expenses, all for the 
childrens1 benefit. (Plaintiff Exhibit 10). 
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25. In September of 1991, Moore had to start making payments 
for COBRA health insurance coverage when his employment with 
Tiffany's terminated. His monthly payment for insurance went from 
$91.90 to the COBRA payment of $625 per month. Moore paid $625 per 
month for health insurance through April of 1992, when the COBRA 
insurance premium rose to $722 per month. That $722 a month was 
paid through March of 1993, when COBRA coverage expired. He spent 
$8,382 in 1992 in health insurance premiums, and $4,811 for such 
premium in 1993, through the time of trial. Moore then began 
paying $260 a month for HMO coverage provided through Metropolitan 
Life, his current wife's insurer. (R. 495-498, Plaintiff Exhibit 
10) . 
26. From August of 1987 to October of 1993, Moore paid 
$21,396.30 in health insurance premiums and for Jamie Moore's 
medical expenses. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 10). 
27. David Moore's COBRA health insurance with Aetna has paid 
$27,263.97 for medical treatment provided to Jamie Moore. (R. 499, 
Plaintiff Exhibit 7). 
28 • Moore filed an individual Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition 
on December 22, 1992 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
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Central District of California, case number LA92-58443-KL. (R. 512, 
Plaintiff Exhibit 8) . Moore was discharged in that bankruptcy 
proceeding on April 30# 1993. (R. 514-15, Plaintiff Exhibit 9). 
29. David Moore's net income for the years 1987 through 1991 
s as follows: 1987 - $20,639; 1988 - $21,197; 1989 - $26,883; 1990 
- $37,610; 1991 - $35,404. (R. 471-477, Plaintiff Exhibits 1, 2, & 
3). In 1992, David Moore received $10,710.00 in unemployment 
benefits from the state of California. He also had a net business 
loss of $7,346.00. (R. 478-479, Plaintiff Exhibit 5). 
30. In 1993, up to the time of trial in October, David Moore 
had no gross income, while seeking employment. (R. 481-482). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred in concluding that the $1,500 a month 
subsistence payment was to continue for a minimum of three years 
after the decree of divorce, regardless of Sandra Moore's 
remarriage or any of the Moore children reaching the age of 
majority. The trial court was correct in finding that the 
agreement between the parties provided for $300 a month in alimony 
and $200 per month per child in child support. Nowhere in the 
decree of divorce is there an agreement by the parties that $1,500 
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subsistence level would continue for three years. In fact, the 
decree of divorce specifically stated that $1,500 amount could be 
modified after the first year. Sandra Moore remarried in July of 
1988. Jenessa Moore turned 18 on August 12, 1988. Holly Moore 
turned 18 on August 14, 1990. Under Utah statutory and case law, 
the $300 alimony payment to Sandra Moore terminated on her 
remarriage. The $200 support payment for Jenessa terminated when 
she turned 18, the $200 payment for Holly Moore terminated when she 
turned 18. Because of the Court Order requiring the $1,500 
subsistence to last for three years, David Moore was improperly 
ssessed $13,100 in alimony and child support payments. 
The trial court required Moore to accept total 
responsibility for providing health insurance for the children, 
from July 1987 through October 1993, David Moore paid $21,396.30 
in health insurance premiums and medical payments for the 
children. Under the trial court's ruling, Sandra Moore has no 
obligaiton to any of that cost. David Moore argues that, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15 Sandra Moore should be 
responsible for half of that amount and that David Moore, already 
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having paid that amount, should be given a credit or deduction 
from any child support arrearage, if any, assessed against him. 
The previous argument, that Sandra Moore should bear 
one-half of the health insurance premiums, applies only if 
moore's argument that the entire $21,396.30 paid in health 
insurance premiums and uninsured medical expenses, over and above 
all payments specifically made for child support, should be 
deducted from his child support obligation. This was requested 
of the trial court, but rejected. A deduction for those health 
insurance premiums and medical expenses paid is consistent with 
this Court's decision in Cummincrs v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Finally, the trial court erred in not reducing David Moore's 
child support obligation, based on the evidence of his change in 
financial circumstances. In this brief, David Moore has marshalled 
all evidence in support of Sandra Moore's claim that support 
payments should be increased, or at least not decreased. The 
evidence supports the reduction in child support payments pursuant 
to state child support guidelines. This Court should adopt David 
Moore's proposed Findings of Fact 30-36 and Conclusion of Law No. 
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11, confirming that, through the date of trial, David Moore had no 
outstanding child support obligation to Sandra Moore. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHILE THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING 
THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
PROVIDED FOR $300 A MONTH IN ALIMONY AND $200 
PER MONTH PER CHILD IN CHILD SUPPORT, THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
$1,500 PAYMENT PER MONTH WAS TO CONTINUE FOR A 
MINIMUM OF THREE YEARS REGARDLESS OF 
REMARRIAGE OR THE CHILDREN REACHING THE AGE OF 
MAJORITY. 
Before the Decree of Divorce was entered, the parties 
negotiated what amount per month would be paid for alimony and 
child support. The parties agreed on the amount of $1,500. Trial 
testimony differed on how that amount was to be broken down between 
alimony and child support. 
David Moore, through a lawyer he retained, initially proposed 
$125 a month per child for the six children in child support and 
$750 a month in alimony, totaling the $1,500 monthly payment. (R. 
458). Sandra Moore acknowledges that specific proposal was made to 
her early in the negotiations. (R. 629). 
13 
David Moore couldn't afford his lawyer, and went to a meeting 
with Sandra Moore and her attorney. At that meeting, the parties 
agreed on $200 per month per child for child support and $300 per 
month for alimony. (R. 460) . Sandra Moore acknowledges that the 
specific division of alimony and child support may have been 
discussed, but does not believe any specific agreement was reached 
regarding such division. (R. 623-633). 
Sandra Moore's attorney prepared the Decree of Divorce. David 
Moore viewed the document, confirming that it designated the $1,500 
per month specifically "for alimony and child support." At the 
time, he was not concerned with the language because it was 
essentially consistent with their agreement, even though it did not 
specifically break down the amounts designated for alimony and 
child support. (R. 462). 
Sandra Moore remarried in July of 1988 (R. 462). The Moores' 
oldest daughter Janessa turned 18 on August 12, 1988. (R. 463). 
According to David Moore's understanding of the Agreement between 
the parties regarding alimony and child support, he informed Sandra 
that he would no longer be paying the $300 a month in alimony 
because of her remarriage. He also informed Sandra that he would 
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be reducing his child support obligation by $200 a month because 
Janessa had reached the age of majority. (R. 462) . Sandra Moore 
acknowledged David Moore discussing such a reduction with her at 
around that time. (R. 634). 
When David Moore and Sandra Moore discussed these issues in 
the summer of 1988, Sandra told David that the Divorce Decree 
didn't specifically designate what amount would be paid for child 
support and what amount would be paid for alimony. (R. 463) . David 
replied that the $200 per child and $300 per month alimony was 
"exactly what we talked about." (R. 463). 
According to David Moore, Sandra Moore then explained that her 
attorney had told her that the attorney had deliberately left that 
language ambiguous so that she could argue she was to receive 
$1,500 a month indefinitely, irrespective of marriage or the 
children reaching the age of majority. (R. 464). 
In her testimony, Sandra Moore acknowledged telling David, 
after August of 1988, that the decree didn't designate the amounts 
to be paid in alimony and child support, only that $1,500 was to be 
paid every month. (R. 635). Sandra Moore denies that her lawyer 
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told her that he had drafted at the document that way deliberately. 
(R. 635-636). 
David Moore declared tax deductions for alimony for $300 a 
month from the divorce until Sandra Moore was remarried. (R. 637 
and Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2 & 3) . Sandra Moore doesn't remember 
if she declared alimony income in 1987 and 1988 (R. 638) . Sandra 
Moore's tax records had been requested back and forth during 
litigation, but were not available at the time of trial. (R. 638). 
The disputed paragraph in the Decree of Divorce regarding 
alimony and child support reads as follows: 
That Plaintiff is ordered to pay $1,500 per 
month to Defendant, in cash each month, for 
alimony and child support during the pendency 
of this action. This amount is regarded as a 
minimum subsistence level for Defendant and 
her six children not withstanding the fact 
that Plaintiff is going to accept a job which 
will initially pay approximately $2,000 per 
month. The parties are ordered to exchange 
financial information and disclose their 
respective financial statements each year and 
renegotiate the level of support and 
maintenance between them once each year for 
three (3) years at which time a permanent 
level of support shall be fixed. For purposes 
of this Decree of Divorce, it is hereby 
ordered that the minimum level of $1,500.00 
shall not be reduced or modified before June 
1, 1988. 
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There is inherent ambiguity in that paragraph because it does 
not break down the amount to be paid per month for child support 
and the amount to be paid per month for alimony. It simply states 
$1,500.00 a month shall be paid for alimony and child support. In 
the face of this ambiguity, Judge Harding admitted parole evidence 
at trial for assistance in interpreting what the parties intended 
by that language. Admitting extrinsic evidence was proper under 
the circumstances. The Utah Supreme Court and this Court have 
repeatedly held that a trial court may consider extrinsic evidence 
in interpreting the contract once the language of the contract is 
deemed ambiguous. Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1252 (Utah 
1983). Once that ambiguity is established, evidence of prior or 
contemporaneous conversations, representations, or other 
statements, for purposes of explaining or adding to the terms of 
the agreement, are admissible. Hall v. Process Instruments & 
Control, 890 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1995). 
Having heard all testimony regarding the negotiations of the 
parties regarding the $1,500.00 monthly payment, Judge Harding 
specifically found that, of that $1,500 amount, $300 per month was 
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for alimony, and $200 per month per child was for child support (R. 
403-405, 415-420). 
David Moore submits that such a finding was appropriate and 
fully supported by the evidence. That finding of fact may not be 
overturned unless clearly erroneous. The error assigned by David 
Moore on this issue goes not to that finding of fact, but rather to 
Judge Harding's conclusion of law based on that finding of fact. 
Even though Judge Harding found that $300 a month was for 
alimony and $200 child per month was for child support, he went on 
to conclude that that $1,500.00 subsistence level was to remain in 
place for three years, irrespective of the remarriage of Sandra 
Moore or any of the Moore children reaching the age of majority. 
That conclusion of law is contrary to Utah statute and case law, as 
well as being contrary to the language of the Decree of Divorce. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5 (5) provides, in relevant, as follows: 
Unless a Decree of Divorce specifically 
provides otherwise, any order of the court 
that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
automatically terminates upon the remarriage 
of that former spouse. 
In this case, the Decree of Divorce did state that *the 
minimum level of $1,500.00 shall not be reduced or modified before 
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June 1, 1988." It is undisputed that no reduction of that 
$1,500.00 monthly payment took place before June 1, 1998, in 
accordance with the Decree. David Moore filed his initial petition 
to modify the Decree of Divorce on or about August 26, 1989 (R. 
95) . 
There is implicit in a divorce decree the provision that 
alimony continues only so long as the divorcing wife remains 
unmarried. Austad v. Austad. 2 Utah.2d 49, 269 P.2d 284 (Utah 
1954). A wife's remarriage to another man after her divorce 
terminates her former husband's duty to pay alimony. Russell v. 
Russell. 587 P.2d 133 (Utah 1978). 
The Divorce Decree in this case does not specifically provide 
that alimony is to continue after Sandra Moore's remarriage. The 
provision that the $1,500 subsistence level is to be maintained at 
least until June 1, 1998 does not apply because Sandra Moore was 
married in July of 1988, after that provision expired by its own 
terms. As such, under Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5 (5) and Utah case law 
authority, Judge Harding erred in concluding that the $300 alimony 
payment was to be made for three years from the date of the Divorce 
Decree. That ruling required the $300 alimony payment for 25 
19 
months after Sandra Moore's remarriage, for a total unjustified 
alimony payment of $7,500.00. That amount should be credited, as a 
matter of law, against any alleged child support arrearage in this 
case, if any. 
Regarding child support, Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.10 provides 
as follows: 
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, or 
has graduated from high school during the 
child's normal and expected year of 
graduation, whichever occurs later, the base 
child support award is automatically reduced 
to reflect the lower based combined child 
support obligation shown in the table for the 
remaining number of children due child 
support, unless otherwise provided in the 
child support order. 
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per 
child amount, derived from the base child 
support award originally ordered. 
Based on Judge Harding's ruling, David Moore is entitled to 
credit for all child support payments required of him under the 
court's order for Janessa Moore and Holly Moore, after they reached 
the age of majority. Janessa Moore turned 18 on August 12, 1988. 
Holly Moore turned 18 on April 14, 1990. As mentioned, the trial 
court required the payment of $200 per month per child for three 
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years after the entry of the Decree of Divorce, or from August 25, 
1987 to August 25, 1990. The court also required the $1,500 
monthly payment to remain in force for at least one year. As 
Janessa Moore did not turn 18 until after that one year period, the 
$200 a month payment required David Moore for Janessa from August 
of 1988 to August of 1990 is improper and should be a credit 
against any alleged arrearage owed by David Moore for child 
support. That amount is $4,800 ($200 a month x 24 months). Holly 
Moore turned 18 on August 14, 1990. The trial court's ruling 
required David Moore to continue paying $200 a month for child 
support for an additional four months, for a total overcharge of 
$800. That total of $5,600 should be credited against the 
arrearage, if any, owed by David Moore for child support. 
Based on the above argument and authorities, trial court erred 
in concluding that the $l,^p0 subsistence level was to remain in 
effect for three years after the date of the Decree of Divorce. 
That error has resulted in David Moore being assessed $13,100 in 
alimony and child support payments that he is not required to make 
under Utah statute, Utah case law, or the Decree of Divorce itself. 
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As such, that $13,100 amount should be credited against any child 
support arrearage ultimately owed by David Moore. 
POINT II 
SANDRA MOORE SHOULD SHARE EQUALLY IN THE COST 
OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND PAYMENT OF UNINSURED 
MEDICAL EXPENSES. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.1 provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
The court shall include the following in its order: 
(1) A provision assigning responsibility 
for the payment of reasonable and necessary 
medical expenses for the dependent children; 
(2) A provision requiring the purchase 
and maintenance of appropriate insurance for 
the medical expenses of the dependent 
children, if coverage is or becomes available 
at a reasonable cost. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15 provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
(1) The court shall order that insurance 
for the medical expenses of the minor children 
be provided by a parent if it is available at 
a reasonable cost. 
(2) In determining which parent shall be 
ordered to maintain insurance for medical 
expenses, the court or administrative agency 
may consider the: 
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(a) Reasonableness of the cost; 
(b) Availability of a group 
insurance policy; 
(c) Coverage of the policy; and 
(d) Preference of the custodial parent. 
(3) The order shall require each parent 
to share equally the out-of-pocket costs 
of the premium actually paid by a parent for 
the childrens portion of insurance. . . 
(5) The order shall require each parent 
to share equally all reasonable and necessary 
uninsured medical expenses, including 
deductibles and co payments, incurred for the 
dependent children and actually paid by the 
parents. 
In this case, Judge Harding required David Moore to accept all 
responsibility to provide health insurance for the children. From 
August of 1987 to October of 1993, he paid $21,396.30 to fulfill 
that obligation. 
Under the Judgment entered by this Court, Sandra Moore does 
not bear any responsibility for any of the premium payments, nor is 
she responsible for any deductibles, copayments, or uninsured 
expenses. The plaintiff submits that this is contrary to the 
evidence, as well as the above-quoted statutes. 
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pavid Moore should receive a credit or deduction in any child 
support arrearage of $10, 698.15. This argument applies only if 
this Court rejects Point III now addressed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT CASH 
PAYMENTS MADE DIRECTLY TO THE CHILDREN, AND 
OTHER EXPENSES PAID ON BEHALF OF THE CHILDREN, 
INCLUDING HEALTH INSURANCE PAYMENTS AND 
PAYMENTS FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES, ARE NOT TO BE 
CONSIDERED CHILD SUPPORT. 
At trial, David Moore presented Exhibit 10, which was a month 
by month ledger of child support and health insurance payments made 
by him for the years 1987 through 1993. For ease in reference, a 
copy of the Exhibit is attached in the Addendum. At the end of 
trial, David Moore's counsel presented Proposed Findings of Fact 
and conclusions of Law to Judge Harding. The conversation between 
Moore's counsel and Judge Harding regarding the submission of those 
Findings and Conclusions is contained on Page 674 of the Trial 
Transcript. The plaintiff later submitted Supplemental Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 389-399). In 
preparing this Appeal Brief, counsel for the plaintiff has noted 
that the Record Index prepared by the Fourth Judicial District 
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Court does not identify the initial Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law faxed to the Court before trial and then 
delivered to Judge Harding the afternoon of trial, as evidenced by 
the Trial Transcript. 
While most of those Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
were not adopted by the trial court, they are relevant to the 
presentation of David Moore's issues on appeal. As such, David 
Moore requests that those proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, attached in their entirety in the Addendum, be included as 
part of the record on appeal. This request is consistent with Rule 
11 (h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which states, in 
part, as follows: 
If anything material to either party is 
omitted from the record by error or accident 
or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, 
the trial court, or the appellate court, 
either before or after the record is 
transmitted, may direct that the omission or 
misstatement be corrected and if necessary 
that a supplemental record be certified and 
transmitted. 
Under that rule, if Sandra Moore has any objection to 
supplementing the record with that document, she may have ten days 
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from the date this Appeal Brief is filed within which to serve such 
objections. 
At trial, David Moore testified about the insurance premiums 
paid over the years after the divorce, as well as the many gifts 
made directly to the children in the form of cash, clothing, cars, 
car repairs, food, vacations, and other gifts. Based on that 
evidence, David Moore's Proposed Finding of Fact 22 stated as 
follows: 
In addition to these direct child support 
payments, David Moore has paid over $70,000 
since entry of the Decree either directly to 
his children or for clothing, cars and car 
repairs, food, vacations, gifts, or other 
miscellaneous expenses, all for the childrens' 
benefit. 
Based on that evidence, as well as testimony of actual child 
support payments made, Conclusion of Law 11 read as follows: 
Under all of the circumstances presented by 
the evidence, David Moore is current in his 
child support obligation to Sandra Moore 
Nielson. 
It was intended by David Moore that the other expenses listed 
as child support include all the specific health insurance premium 
payments and payment for medical expenses listed in Exhibit 10. 
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Frankly, David Moore has not been able to come up with any 
convincing authority that payments made by a parent for food, 
clothing, vacations, and the like may be tabulated and credited as 
specific child support payments. David Moore does, however, 
believe that under the circumstances, the health insurance premium 
payments, as well as any direct payments for Jamie Moore's medical 
expenses, should be legitimately assessed as child support or, if 
not child support per se, that such payments be reduced from any 
alleged child support arrearage owed by David Moore. 
In Cummings v. Cumminas, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
the trial court reduced the plaintiff father's child support 
arrearages by the amount he had paid for medical expenses and 
insurance premiums for the children. On appeal, the defendant wife 
contended that the trial court erred in allowing such a reduction. 
On appeal, this Court affinned the deduction for medical expenses 
and insurance premiums and remanded the case to the trial court for 
a proper accounting of any child support arrearages owed. Id. at 
481. 
The undisputed evidence at trial confirmed that from July 1987 
through the time of trial, October 1993, David Moore paid 
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$21,396.30 in health insurance premiums and medical expenses as 
follows: 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
- Premiums 
- Premiums 
- Premiums 
- Premiums 
- Premiums 
- Premiums 
- Premiums 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
$499.80; 
$1,703.30 + medical expenses of $586; 
$1,435; 
$1,277.10; 
$2,702.10; 
$8,382; 
$4,811. 
While David Moore is unable to find convincing authority that 
all of the over $70,000 paid directly to or for the benefit of the 
children should be deemed child support, authority of this Court 
exists to allow the $21,396.30 paid in health insurance premiums 
and medical expenses be deemed child support or, if not technically 
child support, to be deducted from any alleged child support 
arrearages owed by David Moore. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REDUCING DAVID 
MOORE'S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION BASED ON THE 
CHANGE IN HIS FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES AFTER 
THE ENTRY OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE-
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On or about September 29, 1989, in response to Sandra Moore's 
Order to Show Cause re: Contempt and Child Support Arrearage, 
David Moore filed an Amended Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. 
Paragraph 8 of that Petition stated: 
The Decree of Divorce should be modified 
requiring plaintiff [David Moore] to pay to 
defendant [Sandra Moore] such sums as the 
court may determine based on the parties 
income, as set forth by the child support 
regulations of the State of Utah, for the 
support and maintenance of the four minor 
children presently residing with the 
defendant, until each child reaches 18 or 
completes high school in their regular 
graduating class, whichever occurs last. (R. 
96-99) . 
At trial, David Moore provided documentary and testimony 
evidence that his net income from earnings for the years after the 
divorce were as follows: 
1987 - $20,639; 
1988 - $21,197; 
1989 - $26,883; 
1990 - $37,610; 
1991 - $35,404; 
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1992 - $10,710 unemployment compensation - $7,346 net 
business loss; 
1993 - No gross income while seeking employment. 
In addition, David Moore produced documentary evidence 
confirming that he had filed for bankruptcy in December of 1992 and 
that he had received a bankruptcy discharge in California on April 
30, 1993. 
In his initial proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, which David Moore has asked to be considered part of the 
record pursuant to Rule 11 (h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, David Moore calculated, according to state child support 
guidelines, what support obligation would be required based on that 
gross income. Those calculations are found in Findings of Fact 30 
through 36. Based on those Findings of Fact, under the guidelines, 
Conclusion of Law 11 provided that *under all of the circumstances 
presented by evidence, David Moore is current in this child support 
obligation to Sandra Moore Nielson." 
In ruling on these issues, in his Memorandum Decision of 
December 2, 1993 and in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment, Judge Harding simply concludes that *there is no 
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evidence that this amount [of support] should be increased." Based 
on his ruling, it is also assumed that there was not evidence, 
according to Judge Harding, that the amount should be decreased. 
Trial courts have continuing jurisdiction to make reasonable 
and necessary changes in child support awards, taking into account 
not only the needs of the children, but also the ability of the 
parent to pay. Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). The change in circumstances necessary to justify 
modification of a divorce decree varies with the type of 
modification conteraplated. Provisions dealing with alimony and 
child support are more susceptible to alterations, as financial 
circumstances are subject to rapid and sometimes unpredictable 
change. Whitehead v. Whitehead. 790 P.2d 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In this case, David Moore requested the modification of the 
original divorce decree based on change in his financial 
circumstances. He requested that the decree be modified requiring 
him to pay such sums as determined based on his income as set forth 
in the child support guidelines of the State of Utah. At trial, 
David Moore presented documentary tax return information, 
unemployment compensation documentation, bankruptcy petition and 
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discharge documentation and other verbal testimony to support the 
change in his financial situation since the Decree of Divorce. 
Judge Harding concluded that there was no evidence to support 
the reduction of the $200 per month for each child. David Moore 
understands his obligation to marshall all of Sandra Moore's 
evidence to support the judge's determination and then demonstrate 
that evidence is insufficient to support the judge's conclusion 
that support payments should remain the same. Watson v. Watson, 
837 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In support of her claim that 
David Moore was making, or could make, more than he presented by 
way of documentary and other evidence, Sandra Moore submitted the 
following: 
Sandra Moore had been married to David Moore for twenty years 
and they had "quite a good" standard of living (R. 651-52) . When 
asked if David shared information about his income, what he made on 
an annual basis, Sandra replied, "no, he just really kept me in the 
dark. I was too busy raising our family, I guess, to pry too 
much." (R. 652) . She testified that when they came to Utah in 
1980, they came "under duress" and "did alot of cutting back". (R. 
652-53) . After a while, they bought a home in Pepperwood and 
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started buying property in Alpine. They built a home in Alpine 
over the years (R. 653) . She testified that she believes David 
Moore is capable of working if he chooses to and that his 
unemployment the past two years is voluntary. (R. 653-654) . When 
asked if she believed that David Moore was capable of earning an 
income of at least $5,000 a month, Judge Harding sustained an 
objection of lack of foundation. She was then asked if during the 
twenty years of their marriage, there were any years that David 
didn't make at least $5,000 a month, she responded, XXI knew at 
least that much''. (R. 654) . She testified that David Moore had 
told their daughter, Holly, that there was a point when a company 
he owned was making $200,000 a year. There was no evidences as to 
what his personal income from that company was. (R. 654) . No 
documentary evidence of any kind was presented by Sandra Moore to 
support her opinion that David could have been earning more than he 
was. 
In the trial transcript, from pages 471-483, David Moore 
explains in detail his work history from 1987 to 1983, including 
money earned and expenses incurred. Documentary evidence produced 
confirm the net income figures previously listed in this Brief for 
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years 1987 through 1983• Under those circumstances, David Moore 
submits that marshaling all evidence in favor of Sandra Moore is 
still insufficient, when compared with the evidence produced by 
David Moore, to support Judge Harding's conclusion that child 
support should remain at $200 a month per child per month. 
Based on that evidence, David Moore submits that Judge 
Harding's conclusions regarding child support be vacated and that 
David Moore's initial proposed Findings of Fact 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 
35, and 36, be adopted, along with Conclusion of Law 11, that David 
Moore had satisfied his child support obligation to Sandra Moore, 
through the time of trial of October 1993. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above argument and authorities, David Moore 
requests that this Court credit him $13,100 improperly assessed in 
alimony and child support after Sandra Moore remarried and after 
Janessa and Holly Moore reached the age of majority. Under Utah 
Code Ann. §78-45-7.15 David Moore should receive a credit against 
any child support arrearage owed for one-half of the $21,396.30, or 
$10,698.15, paid in health insurance premiums and for medical bills 
from July 1987 to October of 1993. That is only if this Court does 
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not allow a deduction of the entire $21,396,30, which it should 
under Cummings v. Cumminas, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) . 
Finally, based on the evidence of the change in circumstances in 
David Moore's financial situation, Moore's initial proposed 
Findings of Fact No. 30-36 should be adopted, as well as Conclusion 
of Law No. 11, confirming that David Moore had satisfied his 
support obligation to Sandra Moore through the time of the October 
1993 trial. 
DATED this I '* day of April, 1996, 
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C. 
at 
GORDON K. JENSEN 
Attorneys for David Moore 
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ADDEWDUM 
30-3-4.1 HUSBAND AND WIFE 
or vice versa, 14 A.L.R.3d 703. 
Nunc pro tunc: entering judgment or decree 
of divorce nunc pro tunc, 19 A.L.R3d 648. 
Vacating or setting aside divorce decree after 
remarriage of party, 17 A.L.R.4th 1153. 
Necessity that divorce court value property 
before distributing it, 51 A.L.R.4th 11. 
Authority of court, upon entering default 
judgment, to make orders for child custody or 
support which were not specifically requested 
in pleadings of prevailing party, 5 A.LR.5th 
863. 
Key Numbers. — Divorce *=> 88,152. 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 230, § 4 repeals 
these sections, as last amended by L. 1989, ch. 
104, §§ 2 to 5, providing for the appointment, 
authority, duties, and jurisdiction of court com-
missioners, effective April 23,1990. 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and visitation — Termination of ali-
mony — Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties and regarding the parties, separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and 
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after 
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order 
assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing 
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of 
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services for the 
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Parts 4 and 5. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-^ 
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
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(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the 
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and 
necessary. 
(4) (a) In detennining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation 
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enfnrrp a rmirt ordered visitation; fsrhfrHnle pntpr^fl imder this chaT utes. 75) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights 
are determined. 
t^>j Any order oi1 the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or associa-
tion is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by 
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the 
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the 
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
History: ILS. 1898 & C JL 1907, 9 1212; L. 
1909, ch. 109, 9 4; CX. 1917, 9 3000; R.S. 
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; 
1975, ch. 81,9 1; 1979, ch. 110, 9 1; 1984, ch. 
13, 9 1; 1985, ch. 72, 9 1; 1985, ch. 100, 9 1; 
1991, ch. 257, 9 4; 1993, ch. 152, 9 1; 1993, 
ch. 261, 9 1; 1994, ch. 284, 9 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "debts 
or obligations'' in the introductory paragraph of 
Subsection (1), added Subsection (lXc), and 
inserted "and obligations for debts" near the 
end of Subsection (3). 
The 1993 amendment by ch. 152, effective 
May 3,1993, substituted "members of the im-
mediate family* for "relatives" and "best inter-
est" for "welfare" in Subsection (4); substituted 
"shall* for "may" and inserted "or defended 
against" in Subsection (7); added Subsection 
(8); and made stylistic changes. 
The 1993 amendment by ch. 261, effective 
January 1,1994, inserted "or becomes" in Sub-
section (IXb), added Subsections (lXd) and 
(lXe), and made related stylistic changes. 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
designated Subsection (4) as (4Xa) and added 
Subsection (4Kb). 
Cross-References. — Grandparents' visita-
tion rights, 9 30-5-2. 
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, Title 30, 
Chapter 8. 
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78-45-7.1 JUDICIAL CODE 
mother's health, and set the award at $200 per 
month per child. Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Modification of support 
—Divorce decree. 
The divorce decree establishes the duty of 
support the ex-husband owes to his ex-wife and 
a complaint under this section to modify that 
duty of support is improper. Mecham v. 
Mecham, 570 P.2d 123 (Utah 1977). 
State recovery of assistance to child. 
State, which was joined as a party to the di-
vorce action before court entered order deter-
mining husband's obligation for child support, 
was entitled to reimbursement from the hus-
band for assistance furnished the child before 
entry of the order for support in the amount, 
based upon the relevant factors as set out in 
this section, as set out in the support order. 
Roberts v. Roberts, 592 P.2d 597 (Utah 1979). 
Cited in Kelly v. Draney, 754 P.2d 92 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988); Johnson v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 
696 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Proctor v. Proctor, 
773 P.2d 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Moon v. 
Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 791 P.2d 895 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, New Standards 
for Child Support Enforcement in Utah, 1986 
Utah L. Rev. 591. 
From Guesswork to Guidelines—The Adop-
tion of Uniform Child Support Guidelines in 
Utah, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 859. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband 
and Wife § 330 et seq.; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent 
and Child § 54 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 48 
et seq.; 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 50. 
Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife «=» 4; 
Parent and Child «=» 3.1(5). 
r 78-45-7.1. Medical and dental expenses of dependent chil-dren — Assigning responsibility for payment — Insurance coverage. 
When no prior court order exists or the prior court order makes no specific 
provision for the payment of medical and dental expenses for dependent chil-
dren, the court in its order: 
(1) shall include a provision assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses for the dependent 
children; and 
(2) may include a provision requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for those children 
if insurance coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost. 
ory: C 1953, 78-45-7.1, enacted by L. 
1984, ch. 13, § 3; 1990, ch. 166, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, added the sub-
section designations, substituted "is or be-
comes available" for "is available" in Subsec-
tion (2), and made stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — Divorce, maintenance 
and health care of parties, § 30-3-5. 
J 
78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal. 
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establish-
ing or modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1, 1989. 
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable pre-
sumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or perma-
nent child support. 
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and consider-
ations required by the guidelines and the award amounts resulting from 
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78-45-7.10. Reduction when child becomes 18. 
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age the base combined child suppor 
award is automatically reduced to reflect the lower base combined child s 
port obligation shown in the table for the remaining number of children < 
child support, unless otherwise provided in the child support order. ,"M 
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child amount derived from thied 
base child support award originally ordered. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.10, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 214, § 12. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-
came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45-7.11. Reduction for extended visitation. 
(1) The child support order shall provide that the base child support award 
be reduced by 50% for each child for .time periods during which the order 
grants specific extended visitation for that child for at least 25 of any 30 
consecutive days. Only the base child support award is affected by the 50% 
abatement. The amount to be paid for work-related child care costs may be 
suspended if the costs are not incurred during the extended visitation. 
(2) For purposes of this section the per child amount to which the abate-
ment applies shall be calculated by dividing the base child support award by 
the number of children included in the award. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.11, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 214, § 13; 1990, ch. 100, § 9. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, deleted a third 
sentence from Subsection (1) that read T h e 
amount added to the base child support award 
for uninsured extraordinary medical expenses 
may continue uninterrupted" and made a sty-
listic change in the first sentence. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-
came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45-7.12. Income in excess of tables. 
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level specified in 
the table, an appropriate and just child support amount may be ordered, but 
the amount ordered may not be less than the highest level specified in the 
table for the number of children due support. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.12, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 214, § 14. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-
came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership and func-
tions. 
(1) On or before May 1,1989 and May 1,1991, and then on or before May 1 
of every fourth year subsequently, the governor shall appoint an advisory 
committee consisting of: 
(a) two representatives recommended by the Office of Recovery Ser-
vices; 
(b) two representatives recommended by the Judicial Council; 
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(c) two representath 
tion; and ^ 
(d) an uneven numf 
represent diverse inter 
may consider appropri 
under this subsection r 
(2) (a) The advisory com 
ensure their applicatio 
support award amouA 
(b) The committee i 
Committee on or befon 
October 1 of every fo 
(c) The committee's 
ity of the committee, . 
members of the comn 
(3) The committee memf 
mittee shall be provided 
Human Services and the «3 
later than the date the sub 
History: C 1953, 78-45-7.13, e 
1989, ch. 214, § 15; 1990, c h . £ 
Amendment Notes. — The 
ment, effective April 23, 1990 
"Human Services" for "Social Ser 
section (3). 
78-45-7.14. ChUd si 
The following is the B* 
BASE COMBE 
(Adjusted for 
Monthly Combined 
Adj. Gross Income 
Less 
than 
$200 
$200 
225 
250 
275 
300 
325 
350 
375 
400 
425 
1 
$20 
$23 
25 
28 
51 
56 
60 
65 
69 
74 
78 
2 
$28 
$34 
38 
42 
67 
73 
78 
84 
90 
96 
102 
UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 78-45-7.16 
14 ?. 10 
7$2,140$2,201 
8 2,172 2,233 
2 2,197 
. 6 2,222 
1
 1 2,247 
"• 2,272 
9 2,297 
4 2,322 
18 2,347 
3 2,363 
»8 2,379 
\ 2,395 
>9 2,411 
,5 2,427 
JO 2,443 
5 2,459 
)1 2,475 
3 2,491 
22 2,507 
37 2,523 
52 2,539 
38 2,555 
33 2,571 
A9 2,587 
14 2,603 
29 2,619 
45 2,635 
50 2,650 2/725J 
75 2,666 2,741j 
*1 2,682 2,758^ 
06 2,698 2,7741 
22 2,714 2/791J 
37 2,730 2,80£ 
52 2,746 2,824, 
68 2,762 2,84a 
«3 2,778 2,856 
99 2,794 2 ,87 | 
me of 1,200, subsfi| 
?r Child 1, inc 
• for income of 2,00M 
f 2,100, substiti ^ 
U , and on the Un§| 
tutedw285"for"282 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-
came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
2,259 
2,285 
2,310 
2,336 
2,361; 
2,387 
2,412 
2,439 
2,445 
2,462 
2,478 
2,495 
2,511 
2,528: 
2,544^ 
2,560 j 
2,577j 
2,593^ 
2,610^ 
2,643 i 
2,6591 
2,6761 
2,692 i 
2,708] 
78-45-7.15. Medical and dental expenses — Insurance. 
(1) Only the costs of health and dental insurance premiums for children are 
included in the base combined child support obligation table. 
(2) Uninsured medical and dental expenses are not included in the table. 
The child support order shall require: 
(a) the custodial parent to pay uninsured routine medical and dental 
expenses, including routine office visits, physical examinations, and im-
munizations; and 
(b) both parents to share all other reasonable and necessary uninsured 
medical and dental expenses in a ratio to be determined by the appropri-
ate court or administrative agency. 
(3) (a) If health insurance is available to both parents at a reasonable cost 
and the children would gain more complete coverage by doing so, both 
parents shall be ordered to maintain insurance for the dependent chil-
dren. 
(b) If insurance is not available to both parents at a reasonable cost or 
if no advantage to the children's coverage would result, the parent who 
can obtain the most favorable coverage shall be ordered to maintain that 
insurance. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.15, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 214, § 17; 1990, ch. 100, § 11. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, in Subsection 
(2)(b), deleted "equally" after "share" and 
added the language beginning "in a ratio." 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch, 214 be-
came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-45-7.16. Child care expenses — Expenses not incurred. 
(1) The monthly amount to be paid for reasonable work-related child care 
costs actually incurred on behalf of the dependent children of the parents shall 
be specified as a separate monthly amount in the order. 
(2) If an actual expense included in an amount specified in the order ceases 
to be incurred, the obligor may suspend making monthly payment of that 
expense while it is not being incurred, without obtaining a modification of the 
child support order. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.16, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 214, § 18; 1990, ch. 100, § 12. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, in Subsection 
(1) deleted "(a) The monthly amount of all 
known reasonable and necessary uninsured ex-
traordinary medical expenses and" from the 
.beginning, deleted "in addition to the base 
child support award" after "to be paid," and 
substituted "a separate monthly amount" for 
"two separate monthly amounts"; redesignated 
former Subsection (1Kb) as Subsection (2); and 
deleted former Subsection (2), which read "Un-
less the expenses described in Subsection (1) 
are included in the child support order, or the 
parents enter into a written agreement to 
share the expenses, one parent may not obli-
gate both parents to pay the expenses." 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-
came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID MOORE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SANDRA MOORE (Nielson) 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 864403096 
DATE: December 2, 1993 
JUDGE: RAY M.HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Joe Morton 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on modification to the Decree of 
Divorce. Having heard the evidence and argument of counsel, the Court hereby finds as 
follows: 
1) The parties were granted a Decree of Divorce on August 25, 1987. 
2) At that time the parties had six minor children. 
3) The stipulation, entered into by the parties, and the decree provide a minimum 
subsistence level for the Defendant and her six children of S1500 per month. 
4) This amount was to continue for a minimum of three years regardless of 
remarriage or emancipation. 
5) There is not evidence that this amount should be increased. 
6) The amount of alimony is $300. 
7) The amount of child suppon is S200 per month per child. 
8) At the time of this memorandum decision, only three of the children are still 
minors. 
9) The total amount owed by the Plaintiff in alimony and child suppon is to be 
figured using the following amounts: 
AWUW - A-2. 
a) For the three year period from the Decree of Divorce through August 24, 
1990, the amount owed is $1500 per month. 
b) For the period between August 25, 1990 and March 9, 1991, the amount is 
$800.00 per month. 
c) For the period between March 10, 1991 and February 12, 1994, the 
amount is and will be $600.00 per month. 
d) For the period between February 13, 1994 and July 23, 1996, the amount 
will be $400.00 per month. 
e) For the period between July 29, 1996 and March 22, 2001, the amount will 
be $200.00 per month. 
The amount owing through the current date is to be offset by any amounts previously 
paid for alimony and child support. 
10) Plaintiffs cash payments directly to his children of $300 and S700 are not t 
considered child support. 
11) The value of the 1983 Chevy Citation given by the Plaintiff to the Defendant is 
not to be considered child support. 
12) All other payment's or gifts by the Plaintiff directly to me children in me form 
of cash, clothing, cars or car repairs, food, vacations, gifts, or other miscellaneous expenses, 
are not to be considered child support. 
( l3) Plaintiff is to provide medical coverage for the childrenj 
14) The box seats were not listed in me Bankruptcy and are merefore not subject to 
the bankruptcy order or stay. They are marital assets and subject to distribution by this 
Court. 
15) All other assets were subject to the bankruptcy and not subject to distribution by 
this Court. 
16) The box seats were a marital asset known at the time of the divorce that have no/ 
real monetary value. The seats are awarded to the Plaintiff. 
17) Plaintiffs interest in KC Partners had a minimal value of not more than Si 000 
that should have been divided between the parties. As such the Defendant is to pay the 
Plaintiff S500. 
18) The Plaintiff is not in contempt of coun 
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision 
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval 
as to form prior to submission to the Coun for signature. This memorandum decision has no 
effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 2th day of December, 1993. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID N. MOORE, 
vs. 
SANDRA L. MOORE, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 864403096 
DATE: March 7, 1994 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Joe Morton 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Request for Supplemental Ruling. 
Having received and considered Defendant's request, the Court hereby clarifies its earlier 
memorandum decision as follows: 
1) Each party is to pay their own attorney's fees. 
2) Interest on the arrearages is to be awarded at the statutory interest rate in effect at 
the time the judgement is entered. 
3) Regarding child support, the Court confirmed the stipulation previously entered 
mto by th parties, finding it to be reasonable. As such, the Coun did not set figures for the 
parties' respective incomes. The amount to be paid by the Plaintiff each month until me 
youngest child reaches age 18 is oudined in me earlier memorandum. 
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision 
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval 
as to form pnor to submission to die Court for signamre. This memorandum decision has no 
effect until such order is signed by me Court. 
>Htoett*tei/T & 
Dated this 7th day of March, 1994. 
cc: Steven Tycksen, Esq. 
Gordon Jensen, Esq. 
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FILE COPY 
Steven C Tycksen (3300) 
Lone Peak Law Office 
Attorney for Defendant 
Post Office Box 480 
Draper, Utah 84020-0430 
TELEPHONE (801) 572-2700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID N. MOORE, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
SANDRA vIOORE, 
Defendant 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 864403096 
Judge Ray Harding 
Tim niHtif i i,,HIii? on lor Uiil cm Wednesday, Octohn 7.8, 19CJ3, al the lioui of 
10:00 a.m. The Plaintiff was present in Court and represented by his attorney Gordon 
Jensen. The Defendant was present and represented by her attorney, Steven C. Tycksen. 
The parties were sworn and gave testimony and presented documentary evidence. The 
court took the matter under advisement and on December 2,1993, issued a 
Memorandum Decision. A Request for Supplemental Rulings was filed and the Court 
issued a supplemental Memorandum Decision in March 1994. Based thereon the Court 
does now hereby make and enter the following bindings ol Fart and (, oncliiMnii1, nt I aw. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1- The parties were divorced by an Order of this Court on August 25, 1987. 
2. The Decree of Divorce was based upon a stipulation entered into by the 
AftAata#n 
AUG-24-95 THU 3:52 PM LONE PEAK LAW OFFICE FAX NO. 8QI5531618 P. 2 
parties. Hie Stipulation provided that $1500.00 would be paid by the Plaintiff as a 
"minimum subsistence level of support" for the Defendant and the six minor children that 
were living with her as issue of the marriage. This level was to continue for three (3) 
years regardless of remarriage or emancipation. 
3. The Court finds that of this $1500.00 amount, $300.00 was for alimony and 
$200.00 per month was for each of the six children for child support As of the time of 
trial, all but three of the children are minors. 
4. The Court finds that for the three year period from the date of the divorce 
through August 24, 1990, that the Plaintiffs obligation for child support and alimony is 
$1,500.00 per month. Commencing August 25,1990, through March 9,1991, the 
Plaintiffs child support obligation was $800.00 per month. Commencing March 10,1991, 
to February 12,1994, Plaintiffs child support obligation was $600.00 per month. The 
Plaintiffs child support obligation was and will continue to be $400.00 per month from 
February 13,1994, to Jury 28,1996. From July 29,1996, to March 22, 2001, Plaintiffs 
child support obligation win be $200.00 per month. 
5. The Court finds that there is not evidence that this amount should be 
increased. Regarding child support, the Court confirms the stipulation previously 
entered into by the parties, finding it to be reasonable. As such, the Court does not set 
figures for the parties' respective incomes. 
6. The Court finds that since the time of the divorce the Plaintiff owed and has 
paid annually, total alimony and child support as set forth on the attached summary. 
Defendant is entitled to a total judgment for child support and alimony arrearages 
unpaid in the amount of $26,585.80. Said judgment shall bear interest from the date of 
AUG-24-95 THU 3:52 PM LONE PEAK LAW OFFICE FAX NO. 601553161c P. 3 
entry of this order at the statutory judgment rate of 9.22%. 
7. Tie Court finds that the BYU Box Seats and the interest of the Plaintiff in 
KC Partners arc marital assets subject to distribution at this time. 
8. Tie Court finds that the BYU Box Seats have no real monetaiy value and 
awards them to the Plaintiff. 
not more than $1,000.00 and orders Plaintiff to pay to the Defendant the sum of $500.00 
as her interest therein. 
10. Plaintiff is to continue to provide medical coverage on the children*] 
11. The Plaintiff is not in contempt of court 
CONCLUSIONS OF 1AW AND JUDGMENT 
12. The Decree of Divorce in this matter should not be modified, however the 
Court interprets the Decree as it relates to child support to mean that the Plaintiff will 
pay child support of $200.00 per month for each minor child after August 24,1990, and 
$1500.00 combined child support and alimony from August 24, 198 to August 24,1990. 
13. The Defendant should be awarded judgment against the Plaintiff for unpaid 
child support and alimony arrearages in the amount of $26,585.80 plus interest thereon 
at the statutoi) rate i >f 9.22% a p i pursuant to Utah Code Sections 15*1-4 from the date 
of the entiy of this order. 
' Each party shall bear his o s. 
15. The Plaintiff should be awarded all future right title and interest to the BYU 
Box Seats. 
16. The Defendant should be awarded judgment in the amount of $500.00 for 
AUG-24-35 TtiU 3 : 5 3 PM LONE PEAK LA1* U M U ; tAA M. bUlMJlbiO r. 4 
Plaintiffs interest in KC Partners. 
17. The Plaintiff will continue to provide medical coverage on the children. 
IS. The Plaintiff is not in contempt of Court 
f4ay Judgi Ray Harding 
Distnct Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
Jensen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I am employed by the office of Steven C. Tycksen and that I mailed 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing postage prepaid to the following: 
Gordon Jensen 
136 South Main #721 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
on this \(r~ day of March, 1995. 
K<m 
GORDON K. JENSEN - A4351 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
620 Judge Building 
8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7858 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID MOORE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SANDRA MOORE (Nielson), 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 86440309 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
The plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, moves this Court to alter or amend the judgment 
entered on April 13, 1995 to require the defendant to share equally 
the cut of pocket costs of the medical insurance premium paid by 
the plaintiff, as well to share equally all reasonable and 
necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and co-
payments, incurred for the dependent children. This motion is 
suoocrted bv an accomoanving memorandum. 
DATED this day of April, 1995. 
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C. 
Y7A \£3z± 
GOREON K. JENScN 
WttHnetft- *> 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed this •day of April, 1995, via first 
class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon the following: 
Stephen C, Tycksen 
LONE PEAK LAW OFFICE 
P.O. Eox 480 
Draper, Utah 84020-0480 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID MOORE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SANDRA MOORE (NELSON), 
Defendant 
IVDEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 86440309 
DATE: June 19, 1995 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Laura Cabanilla 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court for consideration of Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment. Having received and considered Plaintiffs motion, together with 
memoranda in support, in opposition and in reply to the motion, the Court hereby denies the 
motion. The Court finds that it has specifically ruled and made findings of fact on the issue 
of health insurance in this matter and finds no justification to alter or amend that judgment 
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision consistent 
with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form 
prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no effect until 
such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 19th day of June, 1995. 
cc: Steven C. Tycksen, Esq. 
Gordon K. Jensen, Esq. 
AltActtMW- £ 
Steven C. Tycksen (3300) 
Lone Peak Law Office 
Attorney for Defendant 
Post Office Box 4S0 
Draper, Utah 84020-0480 
TELEPHONE (801) 572-2700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID N. MOORE 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION-
TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT 
SANDRA L. MOORE, 
Defendant 
Civil No. 864403096 
Judge Ray Harding 
After review of Plaintiffs Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, and for good 
cause appearing herein it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiffs motion is denied. fopf 
DATED and SIGNED this fe'^day of J 4 R « A 9 9 5 
Approved as to form: 
Gordpn K. Jensen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
M. JUDGE RAY HARDING 
AfiAaVtoetfr F 
vtf 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
To Sandra 
$1,500.00 
1400.00 
1^00.00 
1400.00 
1400.00 
1400.00 
$9,000.00 
1987 
To Children 
T f l l 1 -~»m~m~m- —~m m. ^-m-rnrn. 
Health Insurance 
$8340 
8340 
8340 
8340 
8340 
8340 
$499.80 
U U K O I i B i a i H B ' k 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
.0 Sandra 
$1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
400.00 
800.00 
800.00 
800.00 
800.00 
700.00 
516.00 
1989 
To Children 
$ 200.00 -Nessa 
200.00 - Holly 
200.00 - Holly 
400.00 - Holly, 
200.00 - Holly 
200.00 - Holly 
Health Insurance 
$80.00 
110.00 
110.00 
110.00 
110.00 
110.00 
110.00 
Nessa 145.00 
145.00 
145.00 
145.00 
1SQ.O0 
$9,816.00 $1,200.00 $1,435.00 
1988 1222 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August-Nes* 18 
September 
October 
November 
December 
$ 1400.00 
2,000.00 
1400.00 
1400.00 
1400.00 
1400.00 
1400.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1.000.00 
$15450.00 
$200.00 • 
200.00 -
100.00 -
200.00 -
$700.00 
- Nessa 
• Nessa 
• Nessa 
•Nessa 
$8340 
365.00 
365.00 
365.00 
365.00 
80.00 + $586 Med Exp 
80.00 
January 
February 
March 
April-Holly 18 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
S 566.00 
516.00 
516.00 
700.00 
500.00 
300.00 
400.00 
400.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1-00000 
$7,898.00 
$100.00 • 
110.00 -
500.00-
200.00-
100.00-
$810.00 
-Nessa 
• Kids 
(300) (200) 
- Holly, Nessa 
- Nessa 
• Nessa 
150.00 
150.00 
150.00 
91.90 
91.90 
91.90 
91.90 
91.90 
91.90 
91.90 
91.90 
91.90 
$1,277.10 
1991 
January 
February 
March-Maa 18 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
To Sandra 
$1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
800.00 
600.00 
200.00 
300.00 
300.00 
To Chilti Iren 
$200.00-Nessa 
80.00 --Kids 
Health Insurance 
$91.90 
91.90 
91.90 
91.90 
91.90 
91.90 
91.90 
91.90 
625.00 
625.00 
625.00 
625.00 
$6,200.00 $280.00 $2,702.10 
1993 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
$2,900.00 
$3,000.00 
$ 200.00 
$525.00 • 
410.00 -
- Holly $ 
- Holly, Nessa 
722.00 
722.00 
722.00 
260.00 
260.00 
260.00 
260.00 
535.00 
535.00 
535.00 
$2,900.00 $935.00 $4,811.00 
1992 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
To Sandra 
$3,QQQ0Q 
$3,000.00 
To Children 
200.00-Matt 
$200.00 
Health Insurance 
$625.00 
625.00 
625.00 
731.00 
722.00 
722.00 
722.00 
722.00 
722.00 
722.00 
722.00 
722.00 
$8,382.00 
GORDON K. JENSEN - A4351 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
136 South Main Street 
Suite 721 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-7858 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID MOORE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SANDRA MOORE (NIELSON), 
Defendant. 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Civil No. 864403096 DA 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
The plaintiff, David Moore, submits the following Proposed 
Findings of Fan and Conclusions of Law. • 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Decree of Divorce ("Decree") in this case was entered 
2. The Decree was drafted by counsel for Sandra Moore 
Nielson. 
3. David Hijuj i?" was not represented by counsel regarding the 
regarding the drafting of the Decree. 
4. • The plaintiff and the defendant havt» SJ;K children; 
Jenessa, born August 12, 1970; Holly, born April 14, 1972; Matt, 
born March 9, 1973; John, born February 12, 1976; Nathan, born July 
28, 1978; and Jamie Lee, born March 22, 1983. 
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5. The Decree provided that the plaintiff was to pay the 
defendant the sum of "$1,500 per month, for alimony and child 
support." 
6* The Decree does not make any specific allocation of the 
$1,500 regarding how much is to be paid for alimony and how much is 
to be paid for child support per month. 
7. Negotiations of the parties before the Decree was entered 
establish that $300 per month was to be paid for alimony and $200 
was to be paid for the six children of the plaintiff and defendant, 
for a total child support payment of $1,200 per month. 
8. At the time the Decree of Divorce was entered, David 
Moore was earning only $2,000 a month. It was anticipated that 
David Moore's income would increase in the future. 
9. The Decree stated that the $1,500 per month would not be 
reduced or modified before June 1, 1988. 
10* David Moore filed his initial Petition to Modify Decree 
of Divorce on or about September 15, 1989. 
11. In July of 1988, Sandra Moore remarried. 
12. In August of 1988, Jenessa Moore turned 18 and went to 
live in California. On April 14, 1990, Holly Moore turned 18. 
Matt Moore turned 18 on March 9, 1991. 
13. David Moore paid $1,500 alimony and child support every 
month from July of 1987 through July of 1988, plus an extra $500 in 
February of 1988. 
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14. In August/ 1988, David Moore began paying $1,000 alimony 
and child support, deducting $300 paid for alimony based on Sandra 
Moore's remarriage in July of 1988 and deducting $200 per month for 
Jenessa, who reached the age of majority in August of 1988. 
15. From August 1988 to the beginning of April 1990, when 
Holly Moore reached the age of majority, David Moore paid a total 
of $16,414 in child support directly to Sandra Moore. 
16. From August 19- April 1990, Davi d paid ai I additioi lal 
$1,110 directly to Jenessa Moore for support. 
17. From June 1989 through December 1989, Holly lived with 
Davi d Moore :i i , Sandy, Utah. For that seven month period, David 
Moore reduced his child support payment to Sandra Moore by $200, 
representing support for Holly during those months. 
18. Matt Moore turned 18 on March 9, 1991. 
19. From April 1990 through March 1991, David Moore paid 
$9,300 in child support directly to Sandra Moore. During that 
perioc -i\ : • roore paid $700 directly to Jenessa for 
support and $300 directly to Holly for college. 
20. From April 1991 to the present David Moore has made cash 
payments directly to Sandra Moore of $9,300, including one $3,1)00 
cashiers check in December 1992/January 1993 and a $2,900 cashiers 
check in April 1993. 
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21. In June 1993, David Moore gave title to a $3,000 1983 
Chevy Citation to Sandra Moore. It was understood by the parties 
that that was $3,000 toward child support. 
22. In addition to these direct child support payments, David 
Moore has paid over $70,000 since entry of the Decree either 
directly to his children or for clothing, cars and car repairs, 
food, vacations, gifts, or other miscellaneous expenses, all for 
the childrens1 benefit. 
23. In September of 1991, David Moore had to start making 
payments for COBRA health insurance coverage when his employment 
with Tiffanyfs terminated. His monthly payment for insurance went 
from $91.90 to the COBRA payment of $625 per month. David Moore 
paid $625 per month for health insurance through April of 1992, 
when the COBRA insurance premium rose to $722 per month. That $722 
a month was paid through March of 1993, when COBRA coverage 
expired. David Moore then began paying $260 a month for HMO 
coverage provided through Metropolitan Life, his wife's insurer. 
Since August 1, 1993, David Moore has changed to a P.P.O. Insurance 
Health policy with Met Life at a cost to him for family coverage of 
$535 per month. 
24. In November 1988, David Moore paid $586 to Sandra Moore 
for Jamie Moore's medical expenses. 
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2ILn Atffii.Hn, David Moore's health insurer through Tiffany and 
Company, has paid $27,263.97 for medical treatment provided to 
Jamie Moore. 
nly amount payable to Sandra Moore under the Ron 
Davis receivable was the last payment of $4,080.92. That amount 
was paid by David Moore to Sandra Moore as follows: $2,000 paid on 
January 1, 1988; $500 paid on September 5, 1988; $500 paid oii 
September 20, 1988; $500 paid on October 1, 1988; ami $500 paid on 
October 18, 1988. 
2/. David Moore filed an individual Chapter 7 Bankruptcy 
Petition on December 22, 1992 in the United States Bankruptcy Court. 
for the Central District of California, case number LA92-58443-KL. 
28. Day i "1 Moure listed Alan Nielson, Sandra Nielson, and 
Steve Tycksen as creditors in his bankruptcy to discharge < 
related to medical bills, miscellaneous costs, other claims, and 
attorney fees. 
29. Having qualified for bankruptcy protection, David Moore 
had all dischargeable debts discharged by order of the United 
States Bankruptcy Com: t oi s April 30 1^3. 
30. In 1987, David Moore's "gross income" for child support 
guideline purposes was $2,132.00 per month. Based on guidelines, 
monthly support payments i 1,98? were $697. David Moore paid 
$1,200 in child support each month from July to December of 1987. 
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31. In 1988, David Moore's "gross income" for child support 
guideline purposes was $2,061.00 per month. Bases on guidelines, 
monthly support payments in 1988 were $612 per month for the first 
six months and $559 for the last six months for a total of $7,026 
for the year. In 1988, David Moore paid $13,400 in child support 
directly to Sandra Moore and another $700 directly to his daughter 
Jenessa. 
32. In 1989, David Moore's "gross income" for child support 
guideline purposes was $2,692 per month. Bases on guidelines, 
monthly support payments in 1989 were $716, for a total yearly 
child support payment of $8,592. In 1989, David Moore paid $9,816 
in child support directly to Sandra Moore Nielson and another 
$1,200 directly to his daughters Jenessa and Holly. 
33. In 1990, David Moore's "gross income" for child support 
guideline purposes was $3,655 per month. Based on guidelines, 
monthly support payments in 1990 were $979 a month for four months 
and $880 for eight months, for a total yearly payments of $10,956. 
In 1990, David Moore paid $7,898 directly to Sandra Moore Nielson 
and another $810 directly to his children. 
34. In 1991, David Moore's "gross income" for child support 
guideline purposes was $3,347 per month. Based on guidelines, 
monthly child support payments in 1991 were $695 a month for three 
months and $580 a month for nine months, for a total yearly payment 
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of $7,305. In 1991, David Moore paid $6,200 directly to Sandra 
Moore and another $280 directly to his children. 
35. In 1992, David Moore's "gross income" for child support 
guideline purposes was $3,364, or $280 per month. Based on 
guidelines, monthly support payments in 1992 were $73 per month. 
In 1992, David Moore paid $3,000 in child support, or $250 a month, 
as well as $699 a month in health insurance premiums, or $8,382 
total in total health insurance premiums. 
36. In 1993, David Moore has made nothing in "gross income" 
under child support guidelines. He has, however, paid $6,100 in 
child support directly to Sandra Moore Nielson, $935 to Holly and 
Jenessa, and $4,811 in health insurance premiums. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Under the Decree of Divorce, David Moore was to pay $300 
in alimony to the plaintiff and $200 per child per month in support 
until each child reached the age of majority. 
2. That child support obligation was excessive based on 
David Moore's income and was not in line with child support 
guidelines• 
3. In August of 1988, David Moore's alimony obligation of 
$300 per month ended when Sandra Moore remarried. 
4. In August of 1988, David Moore's child support obligation 
was reduced when Jenessa Moore reached the age of majority. 
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5. From June 1989 to December 1989, David Moore's child 
support obligation was reduced while Holly Moore was living with 
David Moore, who was providing her total support. 
6. On April 14, 1990, David Moore's child support obligation 
was reduced when Holly Moore reached the age of majority. 
7. On March 9, 1991, David Moore's child support obligation 
reduced when Matt Moore reached the age of majority. 
8. Because of David Moore's bankruptcy discharge, any 
property settlement between the parties is discharged, as are any 
unpaid medical expenses and any attorney's fees allegedly owed by 
David Moore. 
9. David owes nothing to Sandra Moore Nielson on the Ron 
Davis Receivable. 
10. Based on the Findings of Fact, there has been a 
substantial change of circumstances since the entry of the Decree 
of Divorce. This substantial change in circumstances merits a 
modification in the Decree of Divorce. 
11. Under all of the circumstances presented by the evidence, 
David Moore is current in his child support obligation to Sandra 
Moore Nielson. 
12. Based on his current financial circumstances, David Moore 
is ordered to pay child support per month, representing 
per child per month, for the support of John Moore, Nathan 
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Moore, and Jamie Lee Moore. That support obligation as to each 
child will terminate when that child reaches the age of majority. 
13• Regarding health insurance premiums/ 
DATED this day of October, 1993. 
By the Court: 
Ray M. Harding 
District Court Judge 
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